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Abstract
This paper presents a theory of component based development for exception-handling in fault
tolerant systems. The theory is based on a general theory of composition, which enables us to
factorize the temporal speci-cation of a system into the speci-cations of its components. This
is a new development because in the past e.orts to set up such a theory have always been
hindered by the problem of composing progress properties. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
Keywords: Fault tolerance; Compositionality; Formal methods
1. Introduction
The design of software systems becomes more and more dependent on the use of
components. This is for a good reason. The approach stimulates separate development
of software components, which in turn greatly enhances the components’ reusability,
maintainability, portability, and scalability. A theory for reasoning about the behavior of
a complicated system, starting from the behavior of its components, is crucial for such
an approach; it enables us to infer the behavior of a system of concurrent components
by looking at the individual speci-cation of the components. A prerequisite for this
approach is that components can be speci-ed and veri-ed independently from the actual
environment they will be functioning in.
Most software systems of nowadays are capable of detecting and handling faults
on their own, although the degree of fault tolerance may of course vary. This paper
presents a theory of components composition for a certain class of fault tolerant sys-
tems. Such a theory has not been su7ciently addressed in the past. Most approaches are
restricted to a rather loose composition of synchronized components such as layering
[2, 8, 14], which is too weak to express, for example, overriding of the main function
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of a system by a fault handler. This is not surprising because the needed underlying
theory of composition is thus far lacking. Such a theory essentially provides laws of
the form
P sat A; Q sat B
P[]Q sat C(A;B)
which states that if components P and Q satisfy respectively properties A and B, then
the composite P[]Q satis-es C, which is some combination of A and B. Applying
the law backwardly enables us to factorize a global speci-cation of a system into
local speci-cations of its components, which in their turn can be analyzed and veri-ed
separately. However, the ‘compositionality’ of reactive properties, which are used a lot
in specifying fault tolerance, is di7cult. Many theories were developed e.g. [4, 5, 9, 17],
but all fail for various reasons to satisfactorily address the issue. In this paper we -rst
present a more general theory of composition based on a quite old approach by Singh
[16] to exploit information on when and where (on which data segment) a component
will temporarily suspend its interference. The resulting theory is quite elegant and
expressive. Its consistency has been checked in a theorem prover HOL [15]. The proof
code is available on request. Users can reuse the package to have their use of the
theory checked by HOL. Compared to other approaches such as [4, 5] our approach
uses more constrained synchronization conditions, but what we gain is a great reduction
in the amount of ‘extra’ information required to get a progress speci-cation to compose
well. Building up on this theory we present a theory for composing components of
fault tolerant systems. In particular, we consider the use of exceptions and exception
handling. We will also show how one can use the theory to test a system against an
‘adversary’. In many other approaches, e.g. [3, 6, 8, 10, 14], the presence of an adversary
is treated implicitly, resulting in confusion between the ‘normal’ behavior of a system,
and its behavior under faulty conditions. Because the adversary is now just another
component, we can also test the system against di.erent adversaries. The system’s
reaction may then be calculated using the composition theory.
Section 2 presents the underlying formalism and a general composition theory. Sec-
tion 3 describes our model of exception handling in systems, and presents a theory
to build such a system in a modular way. Only systems handling one kind of fault
are considered. Section 4 generalizes the theory introduced in Section 3 to a scenario
with multiple faults. This paper is not intended to provide a complete formalization of
various fault tolerance techniques, but rather, it provides a skeleton theory which the
user can treat as a template to build his=her own speci-c fault tolerance model.
2. A basic composition theory
Earlier e.orts, e.g. [4, 5, 9, 17], to set up a composition theory for temporal properties
have always been hindered by the problem of composing progress properties. The
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problem can be described as follows. Suppose a component P can progress from p to
q, written as P p → q. What would be a reasonable condition for another component
Q such that the parallel composition of P and Q (written P[]Q) preserves the progress?
In a non-component based approach we would just -x the code of Q, which is an easy
solution, but will render P non-reusable. To increase P’s reusability, we prefer the
condition on Q to be as weak as possible. A -rst attempt might be to require that Q
preserves p. This would make a powerful composition law, except that it is not valid.
During its progress from p to q, the component P may pass through some intermediate
states outside p. Q would then be unconstrained, and may thus block P’s progress.
Another option is to require Q to preserve all intermediate ‘one-step’ progress tran-
sitions done by P in achieving q. One-step progress is progress which can be guar-
anteed by executing a single action in a program, given a certain fairness assumption.
In Chandy and Misra’s UNITY [4] this is written as P sat p ensures q—see
De-nition 2.4 for its formal de-nition. The following law from [4]
P sat p ensures q; Q sat p unless q
P[]Q sat p ensures q
states that any one-step progress from p to q, is preserved in P[]Q if Q does not destroy
p except by establishing q (p unless q). The constraint on Q is almost the weakest
possible, hence maximizing P’s reusability, but to decompose a progress property we
now have to maintain information on all its intermediate one-step properties. This may
be unacceptable for several reasons: (1) too cumbersome, (2) the information is not
always available, and (3) changes in implementation may change the set of intermediate
one-step properties.
For some time the above is the only kind of progress compositionality known, even
after Abadi and Lamport in [1] give a general theory of composition. In [1] a system
P is speci-ed by conditional properties. They are pairs (A; C) where A is P’s require-
ment on its environment, and C is the behavior P is committed to if paired with an
environment satisfying A. Being a general theory it does not however identify the kind
of conditional (progress) properties with useful calculational properties, without which
we still cannot deploy the theory. Attempts, for example by Collete [5], do give more
insight but unfortunately do not extend much beyond ensures compositionality.
In our approach we parameterize a temporal property of a component with a set of
variables V for which the property may be sensitive to external interference. If there
is a way for P to indicate this, for example by raising a Mag a, the property can be
preserved in P[]Q by requiring Q to suspend interference on V while a holds. This
is a stronger requirement than the one proposed in the ensures compositionality, but
it also reduces the amount of ‘extra information’ needed to compose speci-cations,
which hopefully will result in a reasonable compromise.
The programming logic we use is based on UNITY [4]. A program is a set of
terminating, atomic, and guarded actions—if the guard is false the action can still be
executed (enabled) though with no e.ect (skip). An execution of a program is in-nite,
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Fig. 1. An example of a UNITY program.
in which at each step an action is non-deterministically selected but the selection is
weakly fair (no action can be inde-nitely ignored). There are no primitive control
structures (like sequencing, loop, or branch), but they can be programmed. Fig. 1
shows an example of a UNITY program. It is the translation of a fault handler (FH0)
given in Fig. 4—this will be explained later. The code in Fig. 1 shows a program
consisting of a list of actions, separated by [] symbols.
Some notes on notation. In the sequel P and Q are UNITY programs; a, b, p, q, r,
s, and J are predicates;  and  are actions; and V and W are sets of variables. We
write J p to mean (∀s :: J s⇒p s), meaning that under assumption J , p holds for
all states. We use var(P) and loc(P) to denote, respectively: (1) the set of all variables
read or written by P, and (2) the set of all local variables of P (variables writable
only by P). Hoare triples are written as usual: {p};  {q}, and have the usual meaning.
UNITY actions are assumed to be terminating, so the di.erence between partial or total
correctness is irrelevant here.
2.1. Predicate con0nement
A program state can be viewed as a function from variables to values. Two states
s and t are partially equal over variables in V , written s=V t, if s v = t v for all
v∈V . A state predicate is a function from states to bool, or equivalently a set of
states. Given a predicate p and a set of variables V , we de-ne p to be con0ned by
V if it only constrains the value of variables in V . This can be formally de-ned as
follows:
p conf V def= (∀s ::p s = (∀s′ : s′ =V s :p s′)): (1)
For example, x¿y+ z is con-ned by {x; y; z}, but not by {a; y; z}. A predicate which
is con-ned by V cannot be falsi-ed by a program that does not update variables in
V . We write p; q conf V to abbreviate p conf V and q conf V . Predicate con-ne-
ment is monotonic with respect to the set inclusion, and is closed under predicate
operators:
V ⊆ W ∧ p conf V ⇒ p conf W; (2)
p; q conf V ⇒ (p ∨ q conf V ) ∧ (¬p conf V ): (3)
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2.2. Capturing temporary non-interference
We introduce a relation preserves to capture temporary non-interference by a pro-
gram on a given set of variables—keep in mind that the set of un-interfered variables
typically changes during an execution. We write pQ preserves V |q, stating that once
p holds Q will maintain p and the value of variables in V until q holds. Formally:
Denition 2.1. PRESERVES
J; pQ preserves V |q
def=
(∀; p′ : ∈Q∧p′ conf V : {J ∧p∧¬q∧p′}  {(p∧p′)∨ q}) ∧ Q  stable J:
The  in the formula ranges over the actions of Q. It helps the later presentation to
add an extra parameter J which is intended to be a stable predicate of Q (a predicate
which cannot be falsi-ed by any action of Q). See De-nition 2.4 for the formal
de-nition of ‘stable’, and also the paragraph preceding it which discusses the role of
J . Note also that preserves is weak in the sense that q is not guaranteed to occur.
For example, consider the RTU in Fig. 4. The variable r is an ‘output port’ and []
represents an empty port. The property true; r = []  RTU preserves {r}|false states
that if r is not empty, the RTU will not overwrite its value.
Notice that: (1) J; trueQ preserves V |q means that the only way Q can interfere
on V is by establishing q; and (2) J; trueQ preserves V |false means that Q never
interferes with V (Q is not allowed to write to V ). Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 below are
properties of preserves which will be used later. The -rst follows easily from the
de-nition of preserves, the second follows from the de-nition and properties (2) and
(3) of con-nement.
Theorem 2.2.
J; pQ preserves V |q
Q  stable J ∧ J ′
J ∧ J ′; pQ preserves V |q
Theorem 2.3.
J; pQ preserves W |q
V ⊆ W
J; pQ preserves V |q
2.3. Properties and composition
In UNITY temporal properties of programs are expressed in terms of unless,
ensures, and → (leads-to) operators. Their meaning is quite standard—see for ex-
ample [4]. We will have to extend these operators to -t in our theory. For example,
we would like to write P; V; J p → q to express that P’s progress from p to q is
sensitive to external changes to variables in V , but not to external changes to non-V
variables. The latter is in many cases too restrictive for P: it is more realistic to limit
this ‘insensitivity’ to (external) changes to a given set of states. This constraining set of
states is speci-ed by the predicate parameter J in the speci-cation. Because all changes
are contained within J , we can expect that both the component and its environment
preserve J . Or, in other words, J is stable.
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Here is now how we de-ne unless and ensures:
Denition 2.4. STABLE, UNLESS, and ENSURES
P  stable J def= (∀ : ∈P : {J}  {J});
P; V; J p unless q def= P  stable J ∧ p; q conf V ∧
(∀ : ∈P : {J ∧p∧¬q}  {p∨ q});
P; V; J p ensures q def= P; J; V p unless q ∧ (∃ : ∈P : {J ∧p∧¬q}  {q}):
The  in the formula above ranges over the actions of Q. Note that relative to [4] we
add an additional constraint to unless and ensures requiring p and q to be con-ned to
V . Hence, both p and q are insensitive to changes to variables outside V , and hence
the described behavior is also insensitive to those changes. Note also that we only
require the J parameter to be stable. In some cases J is actually also an invariant, but
because local invariants can be destroyed by parallel composition we can express more
by considering predicates which become stable dynamically rather than all the way
from the start (invariant); however, we will retain the habit of calling J an invariant.
And here is how → is now de-ned:
Denition 2.10. LEADS-TO
For all P; V; J , the relation ( p q: P; V; J p → q) is de-ned as the smallest relation
→ satisfying:
(1) If P; V; J p ensures q then p→ q.
(2) If p→ q and q→ r then p→ r.
(3) Let W be non-empty; if for all i∈W we have pi→ q then (∃i : i∈W :pi)→ q.
Notice that P; V; J p → q actually speci-es progress from J ∧p to q. A derived
operator which we will use later is the so-called until:
P; V; J  p until q def= P; V; J  p → q ∧ P; V; J  p unless q (4)
All UNITY laws in [4] can be lifted to apply to the new operators—with small ad-
justments. Some of those laws are displayed in Fig. 2.
Fig. 3 shows some of the new laws. The Locality Lift Law states that a property
which is sensitive to external changes on variables in V is also sensitive to external
changes on any set that includes V . The J-strengthening Law allows us to strengthen
the J -parameter; weakening is however not allowed. The J parameter of → is also
not disjunctive. The J-Leftshift and J-Rightshift laws are used to shift part of the J
parameter in and out of the ‘precondition’ (the p) in p Rel q.
In Singh Law, the J; aQ preserves V |b condition states that Q will temporarily
cease its interference on V as soon as J ∧ a holds, and that this will last at least until
b holds. The law states that during this period of non-interference, if it lasts long
enough, P’s local property of the form p Rel q can be preserved in the composition
P[]Q. If the period prematurely ends, then at least we know that b should hold. The
Scheduling Law is a very useful corollary of Singh Law. Suppose a component P
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Fig. 2. Some standard UNITY laws expressed in the new logic.
can behave as p Rel q and that this property is only sensitive to external changes to
variables in V . Moreover, at the start of this behavior P sets a ‘Mag’ a to indicate
its wish to realize p Rel q uninterfered. This Mag stays high until q holds. If Q
promises to suspend interference on V as long as a is high, the law states that P’s
property p Rel q will be respected by Q. The Until Composition Law is just a
special case of the Scheduling Law. The Transparency Law is another corollary of
the Singh Law, stating that properties of P sensitive to external changes on variables
in V are respected by any partner Q that does not write to V (for example if V only
contains P’s local variables).
The Singh Law is a fundamental composition law in our theory. The law appears
-rst in Singh’s unpublished June-89 Notes on UNITY [16]. This work did not get
much support however. There were problems. The set up was not formal enough and
some technicalities are quite subtle and cannot be treated properly in conventional
temporal logics without -rst class variables (which we now have) [13]. It also -xed
the parameter V , which severely restricts its expressibility. The application is also not
explored enough (for example the Scheduling Law was not identi-ed). We reinvent
the theory, and manage to overcome all those problems challenging Singh’s earlier
attempt.
3. Fault tolerance by exception handling
Exceptions are a familiar fault tolerance technique. Typically, exceptions are handled
by a separate component which may have the capability to override some part of
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Fig. 3. Composition laws.
the main system. We want to formalize this and customize the basic theory of the
previous section to reason about composition of components in exception-handling
based systems.
For the rest of this paper we simply write ‘fault tolerant system’ rather than the
mounth-full ‘exception-handling based fault tolerant system’.
3.1. How it works
Consider now a fault tolerant system FTS, consisting of a main component, mainly
responsible for realizing whatever the desired behavior of FTS in the absence of faults
(the so-called main functions of FTS), and a fault handler. The fault tolerance strategy
is as follows:
(1) The main component is responsible for detecting faults.
(2) When a fault is detected, the main component suspends those activities which may
be a.ected by the fault and throws an exception.
(3) Throwing an exception activates the fault handler.
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Fig. 4. Example: RTU.
(4) When the fault handler has -nished, it restarts the suspended activities of the
main component and suspends its own activities that may interfere with the main
component.
Note that to allow a maximum degree of parallelism we speci-cally require that sus-
pending a component only suspends relevant activities—a more naive strategy would
be to simply suspend the whole component.
To give a better idea, Fig. 4 shows the code of a simple remote terminal unit (RTU)
used to monitor the state of a number of water gates and sensors and to drive the gates
in a Mood control system. What RTU does is to repeatedly:
(1) wait for a command arriving at port c.
(2) in two parallel blocks, rearrange the gates according to the command and read the
sensors.
(3) send the gates and sensors data out via port r.
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The program RTU has three components: Main, FH0, and FH1. Main is the component
implementing the actual task of RTU. FH0 is level 0 fault handler, and FH1 is level
1 fault handler. The program detects and handles three kinds of faults: gate failure,
sensor failure, and memory corruption. See the table below. Faults are multi-levelled:
higher level faults can disrupt not only the main component, but also lower level fault
handlers.
Fault Level Test Exception raised Handling
Gate failure 0 gate[i]=Stuck gtExc Reset gates
Sensor failure 0 sensor[i]=Dead senExc Log event
Mem. corruption 1 checkMem()=Err meExc Reset FTS1
The code is in some C-like language. The symbol || denotes parallel composition.
Throwing (signaling or raising) an exception is done by the THROW e statement, which
simply switches e to true. From that point on a fault handler listening to e can become
active. The statement SUSPEND P suspends process P and all its internal concurrent
processes. RELEASE e,P lowers the exception again and at the same time enables P
and all its internal concurrent processes. So, for example, the code of FTS1 contains a
process (parallel to Main and FH0) modelling some regular check on the checksum of
the memory segment on which Main and FH0 run. A checksum error would indicate
memory corruption, in which case Main and FH0 have to be reset. This is coded by
throwing memExc exception, which will activate the fault handler FH1, and suspend
Main and FH0. Translation to UNITY is quite standard. The program in Fig. 1 shows
the translation of component FH0 to UNITY. Notice that the variables Ppc and Qpc
are program counters used to encode sequencing of FH0’s actions. The variables Prun
and Qrun guard the actions of FH0 and can be switch on and o. to resume or suspend
some part of FH0.
3.2. Fault
Before we go on with formalization we describe -rst what we mean with ‘fault’.
Erroneous states are often named errors, faults being the causes (bad statements of
programs, broken connections of integrated circuits, etc.). Then, fault removal corre-
sponds to error recovery. However, the term ‘fault’ is used in this paper as the system
is studied at behavioral level. So, the adjudged causes are considered as erroneous
states. A ‘fault’ will be represented by a set of program states, namely those erro-
neous states that correspond to the fault. A set of states can be speci-ed by a predicate.
For example, in the program in Fig. 4 the predicate (∃i : 06 i¡4 : gate[i]= Stuck)
speci-es a fault in which one of the gates controlled by RTU becomes stuck. A fault
e has occurrences or instances. An occurrence of e is just the occurrence of one of
the states in e at some point during an execution of the system.
A fault e is said to be removed when the system is brought to a state outside e. As
a fault may not be handled immediately, it may cause further inconsistencies. Conse-
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quently, the removal of a fault does not necessarily mean that the system is again in a
correct state. We do not de-ne the goal of fault handling as the recovery of disrupted
behavior because there are situations where recovery is either unnecessary, impossible,
or too costly. Rather, we broadly de-ne it as a system’s reaction to the fault to bring
itself to some de-ned states. Recovery is then just a special kind of fault handling. For
example, what the RTU in Fig. 4 does in the case of sensor failure is to simply log the
occurrence of the fault. It does not even try to remove it. Obviously the designer hopes
that something outside the system will come and correct the fault after it is reported.
In many situations, this is all that we can do.
3.3. Single-fault-tolerant system
Let us -rst consider a system capable of only detecting and handling a single fault.
This is simpler and enables us to focus on the composition of the main component and
the fault handler. We will show later how the result may be extended to a multiple
faults system.
Let in the sequel FTS be a fault tolerant system, consisting of a main component
Main and a fault handler FH. The fault handler handles a single fault characterized
by the predicate fault. When Main detects an occurrence of fault, it establishes a
predicate detect. Establishing detect can be thought of as modelling the exception
event. The -nal result of handling fault is modelled by a predicate handled. Recall
that we do not require fault handling to remove the fault, but if it does then we have
handled⇒¬fault.
Let in the sequel JMain and J det be two invariants of Main and J FH be an invariant
of FH. JMain is needed by Main to perform its main function; J det is needed by Main
to do fault detection; and J FH is needed by FH to do fault handling. Note that the
occurrence of fault may destroy JMain. The detection and handling mechanism must
on the other hand be strong enough to withstand the kind of fault they are supposed
to handle. It follows that J det and J FH should be on their own invariants of the whole
FTS, since if JMain fails because of fault, then FTS should still be able to detect and
handle fault. So, we assume
(a) Main  stable JMain (c) FH  stable J FH (d) FTS  stable JMain
(b) Main  stable J det (e) FTS  stable J det ∧ J FH :
(5)
Let in the sequel V det and V hand be the sets of variables read or written during,
respectively, the detection and handling of fault. Since detection is Main’s task and
handling is FH’s task, we have V det⊆ var(Main) and V hand⊆ var(FH). We assume that
fault; detect conf V det and detect; handled conf V hand, and also JMain; J det; J FH conf
var (FTS).
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3.3.1. Fault detection
When fault occurs, eventually the system FTS must detect it. So its speci-cation has
the form of FTS fault → detect. The following theorem shows how this speci-cation
can be factorized.
Theorem 3.1.
(1) Main stable J det ∧ J FH; FH stable J det ∧ J FH
(2) Main; V det; J det  fault → detect
(3) J FH;¬detect FH preserves V det|false
FTS; V det; J det ∧ J FH  fault → detect
The conclusion of the theorem states that when fault occurs, FTS will eventually raise
detect. Condition (1) essentially states that each component respects the other’s invari-
ant (see the remark following Theorem 3.2). Condition (2) says that the progress to
detect is actually Main’s local property. Condition (3) states that while detect does not
hold, FH will not interfere with Main’s progress to detect. Notice also that condition
(3) does not say that the fault handler should suspend all activity: only activities that
may update variables in V det need to be suspended.
We can easily prove Theorem 3.1 using the general composition theory of Section 2.
We will -rst give few lemmas, since we are going to use them again later.
Theorem 3.2.
(1) P  stable JP ∧ JQ; Q  stable JP ∧ JQ
(2) P; V; JP p Rel q
(3) a; b conf V ∪W
(4) JQ; aQ preserves (V ∪W )|b
P[]Q; V ∪W; JP ∧ JQ  (p∧ a) Rel (q∨¬a∨ b)
;
where Rel be either unless; ensures; →, or until.
The above is just a variant of the Singh Law. JP and JQ can be thought as the invari-
ants of P and Q, respectively. JP ∧ JQ is then a combined invariant of the composite
P[]Q. Condition (1) of the theorem states that this combined invariant holds in each
component (P and Q). Since a component can be expected to maintain its own invari-
ant, this condition essentially says that each component respects the other’s invariant.
Condition (2) states that we have some local property p Rel q of P. Conditions (3) are
(4) are as in the Singh law, stating some con-nement and temporary non-interference
conditions of Q. Finally the conclusion essentially states that as long as a and ¬b hold
the composite will preserve the behavior p Rel q (also quite the same as in the Singh
Law).
Proof.
P[]Q; V ∪W; JP ∧ JQ p∧ a Rel q∨¬a∨ b
⇐ {Singh law (Theorem 2:15)}
(P; V ∪W; JP ∧ JQ p Rel q) ∧ (a; b conf V ∪W ) ∧
(Q  stable JP ∧ JQ) ∧ (JP ∧ JQ; aQ preserves (V ∪W )|b)
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⇐ {Theorem 2:2}
(P; V ∪W; JP ∧ JQ p Rel q) ∧ (a; b conf V ∪W ) ∧
(Q  stable JP ∧ JQ) ∧ (JQ; aQ preserves (V ∪W )|b)
⇐ {Locality lift (Theorem 2:11)}
(P; V; JP ∧ JQ p Rel q) ∧ (a; b conf V ∪W ) ∧
(Q  stable JP ∧ JQ) ∧ (JQ; aQ preserves (V ∪W )|b)
⇐ {J-Strengthen (Theorem 2:12)}
(P; V; JP p Rel q) ∧ (P  stable JP ∧ JQ) ∧ (Q  stable JP ∧ JQ) ∧
(JQ; aQ preserves (V ∪W )|b) ∧ (a; b conf V ∪W ):
Below are two more lemmas. The left one is a special case of Theorem 3.2; the
other can be proven from Theorem 2.18 in the way similar to Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.3.
(1) P  stable JP ∧ JQ
(2) Q  stable JP ∧ JQ
(3) P; V; JP p Rel q
(4) JQ Q preservesV |q
P[]Q; V; JP ∧ JQ p Rel q
(1) P  stable JP ∧ JQ
(2) Q  stable JP ∧ JQ
(3) P; V; JP p until q
(4) JQ; pQ preservesV |q
P[]Q; V; JP ∧ JQ p until q
Now we can easily prove Theorem 3.1. By Theorem 2.7 it su7ces to prove that
FTS; V det; J det ∧ J FH  fault∧¬detect → detect follows from the assumptions of The-
orem 3.1. But this is simply an instance of Theorem 3.2.
3.3.2. Fault handling
After detecting a fault, FTS should eventually handle it. The speci-cation has the
form of FTS detect → handled. This is how to factorize it:
Theorem 3.4.
(1) Main stable J det ∧ J FH; FH stable J det ∧ J FH
(2) FH; V hand; J FH  detect until handled
(3) J det ∧ J FH; detectMain preservesV hand|false
FTS; V hand; J det ∧ J FH  detect → handled
As in the case of fault detection, Condition (1) states that each component respects
the other’s invariant. Condition (3) states that Main activities that may write to V hand
will be suspended as long as detect is high—again, this does not mean that Main
should suspend all activities. Condition (2) says two things. In the -rst place, it is
FH’s task to actually perform the fault handling. Furthermore, detect is maintained
until the fault handling is completed, which is necessary because otherwise Main can
interfere with the FH before the latter -nishes its task. Theorem 3.4 follows from the
de-nition of until and Theorem 3.3.
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3.3.3. The main function
Main functions are the set of expected behavior of FTS in the absence of faults. In
other words, they are simply the behavior of Main without the fault detection. They
are expressed as a collection of properties of the form Main; A; JMain p Rel q where
Rel is either unless; ensures; →, or until. Recall that A is a set of variables on which
p Rel q is sensitive to external changes. Since the fault handler FH is also in FTS, its
interference on A may destroy the main functions, and therefore we are interested in
conditions that can prevent this.
If this interference occurs during FH’s active time (detect high), it means a fault has
occurred before and obviously the interference is part of FH’s fault handling procedure.
The net result of this interference has been formalized in Theorem 3.4, namely the
establishment of the predicate handled. It remains to see how FH interferes on A
during its ‘suspended’ state. Interferences can still happen because the conditions of
Theorem 3.1 only constrain FH from interfering on V det, and not on A. A possible
(but not the weakest) solution is to strengthen this requirement to
J FH;¬detect  FH preserves var(Main)|false; (6)
stating that during its suspension FH will not interfere with Main at all and therefore
can only perform internal computation. This yields the following theorem, stating the
conditions required to preserve a main function, up to the point when fault is detected.
Theorem 3.5.
(1) Main stable JMain ∧ J FH (2) FH stable JMain ∧ J FH
(3) A⊆ var(Main) (4) Main; A; JMain p Rel q
(5) J FH;¬detect FHpreserves var(Main)|false
FTS; A∪V det; JMain ∧ J FH p Rel q∨ detect
Proof. Notice -rst that since detect conf V det and by (2) and (3) it follows that
¬detect conf A∪V det. Now we derive:
FTS; A ∪ V det; JMain ∧ J FH  p Rel q ∨ detect
⇐ {Theorem 2:7}
FTS; A ∪ V det; JMain ∧ J FH  p ∧ ¬detect Rel q ∨ detect
⇐ {Theorem 3:2; the remark above}
(Main; A; JMain p Rel q) ∧ (Main  stable JMain ∧ J FH) ∧
(J FH;¬detect  FH preserves A ∪ V det|false) ∧
(FH  stable JMain ∧ J FH)
⇐ {we have A ⊆ var(Main) and V det ⊆ var(Main); Theorem 2:3}
(Main; A; JMain  p Rel q) ∧ (Main  stable JMain ∧ J FH) ∧
(J FH;¬detect  FH preserves var(Main)|false) ∧
(FH  stable JMain ∧ J FH):
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3.3.4. Testing with adversary
In the previous three sub-subsections we have formally captured the interaction be-
tween the main component and the fault handler of FTS. It is true that occurrences
of fault have been taken into account, but since neither component is assumed to be
capable of generating fault, we cannot justify yet that the theorems presented so far
reMect FTS’s actual tolerance to faults. To do this we must subject FTS to a component
(usually called adversary) that actually injects faults, and subsequently use our theory
of composition to calculate the resulting behavior.
This approach has another advantage. Di.erent faults may have di.erent reactive
behavior. By treating an adversary as a component we have the freedom to construct
di.erent adversaries to model di.erent faults’ behavior, and subsequently calculate FTS’
reaction.
To show how to deploy the theory, let us consider the transient kind of faults.
To simplify the discussion let us just consider the correctness of FTS relative to a
no-oscillation-burst scenario. Given a fault e, this scenario excludes bursts of rapid
oscillation in the form of a sequence e;¬e; e; : : : and bursts of rapid internal oscillation
among the states inside e (remember that a fault is de-ned as a set of states). 1
Here is then the speci-cation of our adversary:
true;¬fault  adv preserves var(FTS)|fault; (7)
(adv  stable J det) ∧ (adv  stable J FH); (8)
true; noOsc  adv preserves V det ∪ V hand|handled; (9)
FTS; var(FTS) ∪ var(adv); true  noOsc unless handled: (10)
The -rst speci-cation states that the adversary does not interfere with FTS except by
establishing fault. In other words, the only purpose of the adversary is to inject faults.
Note that this implicitly assumes that during the test against adv, FTS is treated as
a closed system. As said in the beginning of this section, although adv may destroy
JMain, the fault detection and handling mechanisms have to be strong enough to stay
functioning. So, as stated by the second speci-cation (8), the adversary is assumed to
respect the invariants of fault detection and handling. Since the adversary can gener-
ate faults, (8) prevents the trivial implementation of fault detection and handling that
simply excludes faults by maintaining J det⇒¬fault. In (9), noOsc is a predicate char-
acterizing moments in which no burst of fault causing oscillation in the values of V det
and V hand occurs. The speci-cation states that this no-oscillation period will last at least
until FTS has -nished handling fault. Notice that this does not restrain the adversary
from corrupting other variables. In particular in the multiple faults scenario this means
1 Oscillation bursts are more di7cult to handle. For example, the gate failure in the RTU example in
Fig. 4 is identi-ed with (∃i : 06i¡4 : gate[i]= Stuck). That is, a fault occurs if one of the gate is stuck.
The program tries to detect this using a loop that scans the gates one by one. If the gates get stuck and
unstuck in random order and at high speed—not a realistic situation, but hypothetically possible—then the
loop may fail to ‘catch’ a stuck gate, and therefore fail to detect the fault.
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that while in no-oscillation burst state for fault e, the adversary can generate other
kinds of faults. Finally, (10) states that FTS cannot inMuence the no-oscillation-burst
period of adv.
Now let us see how this kind of adversary inMuences our FTS:
Theorem 3.6. INTERFERENCE ON THE MAIN FUNCTION
(1) FTS; A∪V det; JMain ∧ J FH p Rel q∨ detect
(2) FTS stable J det ∧ J FH
(3) adv stable J det ∧ J FH
(4) true;¬fault adv preserves var(FTS)|fault
FTS[]adv; var(FTS); J det ∧ J FH  (JMain ∧p) Rel (q∨ fault∨ detect)
Condition (1) is the same as the conclusion of Theorem 3.5, stating what we know
about the main function after possible interference by FH. Condition (2) captures what
is said earlier: J det ∧ J FH should on its own be an invariant of the FTS so that when
JMain is destroyed by fault its detection and handling do not fail too. Conditions (3)
and (4) are just the speci-cations of the adversary as in (7) and (8). The conclusion
states essentially that we can expect the main function p Rel q to be preserved when
no fault nor exception (detect going high) occurs. The proof is not too di7cult and,
due to limited space, is left to the reader.
Let in the sequel V det+hand = V det ∪V hand and Z = V det ∪V hand ∪ var(adv). The
following theorem states how the adversary can inMuence fault detection:
Theorem 3.7. INTERFERENCE ON THE FAULT DETECTION
(1) FTS; V det; J det ∧ J FH  fault → detect
(2) adv stable J det ∧ J FH
(3) true; noOsc adv preservesV det+hand|handled
(4) noOsc conf Z
FTS[]adv; Z; J det ∧ J FH  fault∧ noOsc → (detect∧ noOsc)∨ handled
Condition (1) of the theorem is the same as the conclusion of Theorem 3.1, stating
FTS’s promise to detect faults. Conditions (2) and (3) are just the speci-cations of the
adversary as in (8) and (9). Condition (4) states that noOsc is a predicate mentioning
only adversary’s variables and variables relevant to detection and handling of fault.
The conclusion of the theorem simply states that during a no-oscillation-burst period
of adv, an occurring fault will be either detected or handled. The next theorem will
states that when it is detected, then it will also be handled, and so we are done.
Proof. By the PSP law, the conclusion follows from: (a) noOsc unless handled and
(b) fault∧ noOsc → detect∨¬noOsc∨ handled. The -rst follows from the (10) and
the third condition of Theorem 3.7. The second follows from the fact that
handled conf V det holds and from Theorem 3.2.
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The next theorem will state that during a no-oscillation-burst period of the adversary,
fault handling by FTS can be completed.
Theorem 3.8. INTERFERENCE ON THE FAULT HANDLING
(1) FTS; V hand; J det ∧ J FH  detect → handled
(2) adv stable J det ∧ J FH
(3) true; noOsc adv preserves V det+hand|handled
(4) noOsc conf Z
FTS[]adv; Z; J det ∧ J FH  detect∧ noOsc → handled
Except for the -rst condition, which states that FTS promises to do fault handling,
the other conditions are the same as in Theorem 3.7, so we will not repeat their
explanation. The proof of the above theorem is quite similar to that of Theorem 3.7.
Now, combining Theorems 3.7 and 3.8 we get the fault tolerance property that we
expect, namely:
FTS[]adv; V det ∪ V hand ∪ var(adv); J det ∧ J FH; fault ∧ noOsc → handled;
(11)
stating that during non-burst time of the adversary, an occurring fault can be completely
handled by FTS.
4. One-level, multiple faults handling
The previous section shows a theory for composing a fault tolerant system from
a main and a fault handling component. We have also shown how the general com-
position theory can be used to predict how a system actually reacts to an adversary.
However, so far we only discuss systems capable of dealing with only one fault, which
is not too realistic; in practice we are typically confronted with multiple faults, each
requiring a di.erent way of detection and handling. Fortunately, it is not too di7cult
to generalize the single fault theory to the multiple faults case.
We will now assume a set F of fault names or codes. For each fault code e ∈ F
the fault that is associated with e is denoted by faulte. Remember that a fault is here
de-ned as a set of states which are considered as abnormal. This can be described by
a predicate. So {faulte | e∈F} is a set of faults, and F is like a set of indices. Though
obviously there is a distinction between a fault and its code, in the sequel we will
often use them interchangeably.
The detection of fault e ∈ F is denoted by detecte, and the goal of its handling by
handlede. The invariants needed to detect and handle e are denoted by, respectively,
J dete and J
FH
e . The sets V
det
e and V
hand
e denote the set of variables possibly read or
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written during, respectively, the detection and handling of e. We also de-ne
fault = (∃e: e ∈ F : faulte)
detect = (∃e: e ∈ F : detecte)
handled = (∃e: e ∈ F : handlede)
J det = (∀e: e ∈ F : J dete )
J FH = (∀e: e ∈ F : J FHe )
V det = (∪e: e ∈ F : V dete )
(12)
It is possible, that when the system is handling an occurrence of fault d an occurrence of
another fault e causes the handling of d to fail. This requires multi-level fault handling.
This will be discussed later, for now we exclude this possibility. This implies that faults
in F cannot destroy each other’s detection and handling invariants.
The conclusions of Theorems 3.5, 3.1, and 3.4 are actually what we can consider
as the speci-cations of a single fault FTS (since they state FTS’ fault tolerance com-
mitment). These speci-cations must be adapted to reMect multiple faults. Here are the
new ones. For all fault e∈F :
Detection: FTS; V dete ; J
det ∧ J FH  faulte → detecte; (13)
Handling: FTS; V hande ; J
det ∧ J FH  detecte → handlede; (14)
MainFunction: FTS; A ∪ V det; JMain ∧ J FH  p Rel q ∨ detect: (15)
The A in (15) is the set of variables on which the main function behavior p Rel q is
sensitive to external interference.
The -rst two speci-cations specify the detection and handling of each kind of fault.
Notice that the properties are speci-ed using to the combined invariant J det and J FH
rather than J dete ∧ J FHe separately. The latter would have been su7cient, but since we
have assumed that faults in F do not destroy each other’s invariants, we can just as well
use the combined invariant—it yields simpler formulas. The third speci-cation above
speci-es a main function with possible interruptions when faults are detected. Notice
that the form is the same as in the single fault case (Theorem 3.5), except that now
detect is the disjunctions of all detecte. In fact we can view a multiple faults system
as an ordinary single fault system, but with additional speci-cations (13) and (14).
To factorize the new speci-cations we need to generalize Theorems 3.5, 3.1, and 3.4
(these specify how to do factorization in the single-fault scenario). Since (15) has the
same form as in the single fault system, we can simply use Theorem 3.5 to factorize it.
Subsequently, by instantiating V det, V hand, fault, detect, and handled to V dete , V
hand
e ,
faulte, detecte, and handlede we can reuse Theorems 3.1 and 3.4 to factorize the other
two speci-cations. Merging them together, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. FACTORIZING MULTIPLE FAULTS
FTS satis-es speci-cations (13)–(15) provided it meets the following conditions:
(1) Main stable J det ∧ J FH; FH stable J det ∧ J FH;
(2) Main stable JMain ∧ J FH; FH stable JMain ∧ J FH;
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(3) Main; V dete ; J
det  faulte → detecte;
(4) J det ∧ J FH; detecte Main preservesV hande |false;
(5) Main; A; JMain p Rel q;
(6) FH; V hande ; J
FH  detecte until handlede;
(7) J FH;¬detecte  FHpreserves V dete |false;
(8) J FH;¬detect FH preserves var(Main)|false;
(9) A⊆ var(Main):
Notice that the theorem gives a factorization which is more general than the sim-
plistic sequential handling of faults. In the latter approach, when fault e occurs when a
detection or handling process of another fault d is still at work, then the detection and
handling of e will have to wait. In the above factorization, the only safety conditions
that may impose sequencing are (4) and (7). However, (4) simply states that Main’s
access to V dete is blocked when the ‘exception’ detecte has been raised, and otherwise
Main is allowed to detect e (for which it needs access to V dete ) regardless whether or
not there is another fault being detected or handled. Similar reasoning applies to (7).
So, concurrent detection and handling of di.erent faults is possible. Also: even though
(3) and (6) delegate fault detection and handling of all fault types to respectively Main
and FH, by the above argument we are allowed to partition Main and FH into smaller
components, each detecting and handling a speci-c partition of F .
We still have one remaining question: how would FTS now react to an adversary?
Obviously we need a di.erent adversary to generate multiple faults. The speci-cation
now reads:
true;¬fault  adv preserves var(FTS)|fault; (16)
adv  stable J det ∧ adv  stable J FH; (17)
true; noOsce  adv preserves V dete ∪ V hande |handlede; (18)
FTS; var(FTS) ∪ var(adv); true  noOsce unless handlede: (19)
The -rst two speci-cations are just the same as in the single fault adversary, except
that the interpretation is slightly di.erent. In particular, the -rst states that the only way
the adversary can inMuence FTS is by generating a fault—it does not matter which one.
In (18) noOsce characterizes the periods in which the adversary does not repeatedly
change the variables in V dete ∪V hande . Theorem 3.6 states how a single fault adversary
inMuences the main function. However, the conditions constraining adv in the theorem
only refer to that part of adv’s speci-cations that for single and multi faults adv remains
the same. Consequently the theorem also applies to multi fault systems. Theorems 3.7
and 3.8, stating the adversary’s inMuence on the fault detection and handling, can be
reused using the same variables instantiation used to obtain Theorem 4.1. The following
theorem summarizes this:
Theorem 4.2. REACTION TO MULTIPLE FAULTS
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If FTS satis-es speci-cations (13)–(15), and if adv satis-es (16)–(19) then the
composite FTS [] adv satis-es:
(1) FTS[]adv; var(FTS); J det ∧ J FH;  (JMain ∧p) Rel (q∨ fault∨ detect);
(2) FTS[]adv; Z; J det ∧ J FH  faulte ∧ noOsce → (detecte ∧ noOsce)∨ handlede;
(3) FTS[]adv; Z; J det ∧ J FH  detecte ∧ noOsce → handlede;
where Z =V dete ∪V hande ∪ var(adv).
In the RTU example from Fig. 4 the occurrence of memory corruption fault is quite
disastrous. Not only that it threatens RTU’s main function, but also the detection and
handling of other faults. A commonly used technique is to deal with this is multi
level fault handling. Faults are divided into several levels. The occurrence of a level
i fault may threat the detection and handling of level j faults only if i¿j. For each
level i we have a fault handler FHi. The handlers of higher level faults can over-
ride lower level ones. Note that each level may consist of multiple kinds of faults
and hence FHi may consist of smaller concurrent components. Let FTS0 =Main and
FTSi+1 = FTSi[]FHi. Relative to FTSi+1, we can view FTSi as Main and FHi+1 as the
fault handler in the ordinary one-level fault handling scenario from Section 3. So, we
can in principle generalize the theory in Section 3 to multi-level scenario by applying
it at each level.
5. Concluding remarks
We have given a formal theory of exception handling. It works on systems that
consist of a main component and a fault handler. The main component is responsible
for carrying out the normal operation of the system and for the detection of faults and
raising the corresponding exceptions. The fault handler handles faults and is activated
by exceptions. Theorems 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 state the conditions required on each of the
component in order for the other to carry out its function properly. The condition on
a component can be veri-ed without the code of the other components. This is a quite
useful property when used in the context of a component based engineering approach.
The approach has many practical advantages but requires components to be developed
separately, and hence also veri-ed separately. It should be noted that while some as-
pects, like the preservation condition, can be veri-ed without much information on
the partner components, there are aspects that require a lot more partner-information,
such as the condition requiring that the components respect each other invariants. More
detailed partner-information may not be available until some later phase in the devel-
opment of the corresponding component, and hence its cross veri-cation will have to
wait until the phase is reached.
The reader may want to compare our approach to the one in [11]. It uses an almost
similar model of fault handling, but its theoretical approach is very di.erent. It uses
program transformations to inject faults and to add a fault handler. The resulting fault
tolerance theory essentially relates the behavior of a program before and after the
transformations. Program composition is however a more direct and natural way to
I.S.W.B. Prasetya, S.D. Swierstra / Theoretical Computer Science 290 (2003) 1201–1222 1221
model adversaries and fault handlers, which is why our approach yields a theory which,
in our opinion, is more natural and elegant.
We have been careful to avoid unnecessarily limiting the parallelism between com-
ponents. For example the condition Main preservesV hand|false in Theorem 3.4 does
not say that Main has to halt all operation while the fault handler is busy. It just says
that it has to temporarily suspend interference on variables relevant to the handling of
the fault currently being handled.
Although the main theory (Section 3) is based on a simple model in which there is
only one kind of fault and one fault handler to handle it, Section 4 discusses how the
theory can be extended to multiple faults and multi-level fault handling. Di.erent fault
handling components can work in parallel, as long as they meet the temporary non-
interference conditions stated in our laws. We use UNITY, which is chosen because
of its axiomatic style: it is easier to incorporate our compositionality extension in this
style. The theory should in principle also work with, for example, Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL), which is more operational-styled but has a quite similar computation
model to UNITY.
For future research, it may be interesting to see how well our theory can scale up
when dealing with real problems. There is an interesting work by Liu and Joseph [12]
to formalize -ner aspects of fault tolerance such as real time, scheduling, and limited
availability of resources. It may be interesting to see how well our compositional model
can be extended with this kind of aspects. Although preservation and con-nement
conditions are quite easy to verify, the composition laws cannot be applied in arbitrary
order or else we may end up with constraints which are too strong for the environment
of a component. It may be interesting to investigate if there is some heuristics in this. It
may also be interesting to see how our approach can be combined with compositional
model checking approach such as [7].
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